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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE DEBT LIMIT IMPOSED BY ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 3, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, WAS NOT EXCEEDED.

1. The debt was valid when created; subsequent expenditures could not invalidate it. The debt may be floated
from the year in which incurred to a subsequent year or
years.
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2. If a portion of the bonds are declared invalid, plaintiff and appellant should have judgment for all bonds not
in excess of the constitutional maximum.
ARGUMENT
P O I N T I.
THE DEBT LIMIT IMPOSED BY ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 3, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, WAS NOT EXCEEDED.

1. The debt was valid when created; subsequent expenditures could not invalidate it. The debt may be floated
from the year in which incurred to a subsequent year or
years.
The respondent, Spring City, having elected to rely
solely upon the provisions of Section 3, Article XIV, of
the Utah State Constitution to conclude the unconstitutionality of the disputed bond issue, the appellant
in its reply addresses itself solely to that proposition,
and as to other issues upon which this appeal is based,
appellant will rely upon its arguments in the original
appeal brief.
In asserting the validity of the bonds under Section
3 of Article X I V the appellant maintains that as of January 15, 1948, the time the obligation of Spring City was
created and assumed, the debt was valid and constitutional because potential current revenues had not been expended or appropriated. Kespondent at page 9 of his
brief states that there is no evidence before the court t h a t ^
the 1948 expenditures of Spring City were not regular
operating expenses. With respondent's position in respect
thereto we must necessarily take issue particularly in
light of the cases and conclusions in the exhaustive note
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in A.L.R. Vol. 159, which at page 1263 says:
"The rule appears to be well settled that when
a municipality * * * has created a contractual
indebtedness which at the time of its creation is
not in excess of the amount which it may reach
under the constitutional limit of taxation or which
may reasonably be anticipated, the indebtedness
cannot thereafter be invalidated by the governmental subdivision by making expenditures for
other purposes in excess of its revenue for the
year."
Numerous cases therein cited uphold that theory.
In Carl B. Miller Tractor Company v. Hope, 218 Iowa
1235, 257 N.W. 312, it is said:
"It seems certain that the limit of valid
expenditure is reached when the note or collectible
revenue is equaled and from then on all expenditures are within the ban of the statute. * * * It
seems certain that if expenditures during any
year were in excess of collectible revenues, the
county auditor could not go back in a year and
select certain items for rejection and thus reach
a position in which obligations subsequently incurred could validly be paid and the prior items
selected for rejection be invalidated * * *."
Another important case cited, Buxton S. Stationery
Company v. Craig County, 53 Okla. 65,155 P. 215, states:
"An ordinary debtor may incur indebtedness
in excess of his ability to pay and he may pay
debts in such order as he chooses; but a county
cannot incur valid obligations exceeding in any
one year the income and revenue provided for
such year * * * but it is far from being a matter
of indifference if invalid claims founded upon
void contracts are paid before valid claims found3
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ed upon valid contracts. Parties entering into
contracts with a county are bound to take notice
of constitutional limitations and to ascertain as
to what extent the revenues have been appropriated to existing liability; but they are not
bound to anticipate and no amount of prudence
or foresight would enable them to foresee that
illegal claims would be incurred by officers willing
to violate the constitution."
The note of the editor goes on to say :
"It seems to be a general rule that a provision
against a governmental subdivision exceeding in
any year its current revenue does not prevent it
from paying a claim out of the revenue of a year
subsequent to that in which it was incurred, if
the contract on which the claim is based was valid
when it was made."
In Nelson County Fiscal Ct. v. McCrocklin, 175 Ky.
199,194 S.W. 323, the court said:
"After a particular debt has been incurred,
the county cannot incur other debts for current
expenses not indispensably necessary to the maintenance of the county government, and include
such subsequent debts in its estimated liabilities
for the purpose of defeating the prior debt in
question.
"* * * Suppose the county, after contracting
for a new vault for the county clerk's office, should
decide to dispose of the old furniture and purchase new furniture for the courthouse. In determining whether the debt for the new vault exceeded the revenue and income for the year in
which it was incurred, the salaries of the county
officers for the entire year must be taken into
consideration, for they are fixed charges which
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must be met at all hazard. But the debt subsequently incurred for the new furniture should
not be included for the debt is not indispensably
necessary to the maintenance of the county government."
How may respondent Spring City rely as it does upon the lack of evidence in the record to show that 1948 expenditures were not "regular operating expenses" when
the cases clearly hold that even regular operating expenses subsequently incurred or paid may not invalidate
a pre-existing valid debt? The burden of proof to show
that required and fixed expenditures have, as of the time
of assumption of a disputed debt, been in excess of revenues for the current year is upon the defendant. Certainly on January 15th, the date of the issue now considered, expenditures for the year could not have exceeded potential revenues for that year, and the defendant is required to affirmatively plead and prove any
fixed charges which must be anticipated during the
remainder of the year. Kule 8 (c) U.E.C.P. requires
illegality, as an affirmative defense, to be pleaded as such.
20 Am. Jur., p. 142, Evidence, Sec. 137 says:
"As to affirmative defenses asserted by the
defendant, he is the actor and hence must establish
the allegations of such defenses."
Sec. 143 at p. 149 of the same volume says:
"The burden of proving illegality or invalidity is upon the party who alleges it. The law
will not presume illegality in the execution of a
contract or other document. Where the defendant
confesses in effect the cause of action alleged by
the plaintiff but seeks to avoid it by setting up
5
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illegality or invalidity he has the burden of
proving such defense."
If, as the respondent implies, the record is silent
on this matter, then the evidence does not support the
findings and judgment of the lower court.
We renew our argument that the critical factor in
determining constitutional validity of bonds is the time
the debt is created or assumed. On January 15th the
"taxes for the current year" within the meaning of Section 3 of Article XIV were still available for the satisfaction of a debt such as the one here disputed.
If the debt limit had not as of that time been exceeded, then by authority of Muir v. Murray City, 55
Utah 368, 186 P. 433, it is immaterial that the time for
payment was provided to be in a year or years subsequent. See also 159 A.L.K. at page 1267 (the italicized
material on page 4 of this brief) to the same effect.
In Tuggle v. City of Barbourville, 294 Ky. 351, 171
S.W. 2d 1008, a floating indebtedness was adjudged to be
valid under constitutional restrictions similar to those in
this state. In that case, a city council was declared to
have authority to fund city obligations, valid when created, the satisfaction of which was prevented by a failure
of current revenues to meet the city's necessary obligations created subsequent to and the debts which were
funded. In that case the city ordinance passed September
4, 1942, provided for the issuance of four percent (4%)
bonds to the amount of $33,000.00, the last to mature in
1962. The same constitutional objections were interposed
to that issue as have been set up here by the defendant
and respondent. In that case the court said :
6
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"The record shows that the indebtedness
sought to be refunded was incurred for the purposes and in the manner stated and that being
valid obligations at the time within the purview
of sections 157 and 158 of the constitution there
is nothing * * * which would prevent a holding
that the proposed issue is valid."
For the court's consideration, a material portion of
section 157 of the Kentucky Constitution provides:
"No county, city, town, taxing district or
other municipality shall be authorized or permitted to become indebted in any manner or for
any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year
the income and revenue provided for such year
without the assent of two-thirds of the voters
thereof * * *."
It must certainly be said that the improvements procured through the flotation of this disputed issue were
necessary and required expenditures of the year. The
express recitation in the authorizing proceedings stated
that there was an "immediate, imperative and pressing
need of raising funds to the amount of $12,000.00 for the
purpose of extending and improving the power and light
plant to be owned and controlled by the city." The
resolution further recited that "$12,000.00 may be raised
at this time without incurring any indebtedness or liability by said city in excess of the revenue of said city
for the current year 1948." (Plaintiff's Ex. B [resolution authorizing bonds] P. 2). Under the authority of
Sections 10-8-2, 10-8-6 and 10-8-14, Utah Code Annotated
1953, the city council had express power and authority
to make all the material findings upon which that recitation was based and to procure the flotation of indebt-
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edness which is now disputed. If necessary obligations
arising subsequent to that flotation had exhausted taxes
and revenues anticipated, then under authority of the
Tuggle case and the Muir case, supra, city officials would
be entitled to float this indebtedness over to years subsequent to the year in which incurred.
Upon that basis we renew our argument that a different rule would demoralize presently valid and binding obligations known as tax anticipation notes or bonds,
for this reason: that a tax anticipation note is valid if
there are unexpended revenues or potential revenues
available to meet it at the time the note was executed
and delivered. Subsequent diversions could deprive the
holder of the note or bond of his payment under a rule
sought by the respondent. The holder has no lien, garnishment or encumbrance upon taxes anticipated and
could not protect himself by enjoining public officials
from appropriating the taxes when collected for purposes other than for the satisfaction of his claim. It is
this type of diversion to which we most particularly
object, a diversion impliedly covenanted against by the
city officials of Spring City.
2. If a portion of the bonds are declared invalid, plaintiff and appellant should have judgment for all bonds not
in excess of the constitutional maximum.
C. J.S., Vol. 64, P. 506, Sec. 1914 says :
"Where the limit of indebtedness has not
been previously reached, bonds which in the
aggregate exceed the limit are void only to the
extent of excessive issue."
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43 Am. Jur., P. 290, Public Securities and Obligations, Sec. 26, states:
"It is well settled that an over-issue of bonds
by a political subdivision—that is, where a portion of the bonds, although not all of them, is in
excess of the amount authorized or the debt limit
—does not affect the validity of an entire issue
of bonds but only those in excess of what is authorized."
If this court adopts the view that a bondholder is
required to take notice of certain fixed charges which
would cut down the borrowing power when that power
is measured by current revenue, then we submit that
there is nothing in the record which would show fixed
charges which in the aggregate would cut down current revenues to leave a tolerance of less than $13,498.67
as of January 15th; and that as of that date Spring City
officials had an autonomous borrowing potential of $13,498.67. The burden of showing the contrary is upon
defendant and respondent. The record discloses that it
has failed in this respect. However, in the event this
court is of the opinion that fixed charges of which any
purchaser or holder must take notice are shown by the
record to have limited that borrowing power, then the
case ought to be reversed and remanded for further proceedings for the purpose of determining to what extent,
exactly, the sum of $13,498.67, added to those fixed
charges, together with expenditures made between January 1st and 15th, had exceeded the revenues realized by
Spring City in the year 1948. 64 C.J.S. P. 503, Municipal
Corporations, Sec. 1911, provides:
9
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"Some statutory limitations refer only to the
amount of bonds or stock which are issued at
any one time or within any one fiscal year, but
other charter or statutory limitations, by their
express terms, or the constructions placed thereon, are applicable to the aggregate bonded indebtedness of the municipality, or the aggregate
amount of its outstanding stock. Whether a limitation of bonded indebtedness is exceeded by a
particular issue of bonds must be determined as
of the time of the actual issuance of the bonds,
and not as of a prior date when the bonds are
authorized by popular vote, or a subsequent date,
such as the date when the bonds are payable, or
a date when the tax valuations are lower."
The case most highly emphasized in respondent's
brief of Fritch v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
County, 15 Utah 82, 87 P. 1026, defines "debt" as being
an obligation incurred during a year whether for goods
or services or other expenses customarily to be incurred
in the administration of government. Even under th<>
Fritch case we fail to see how the constitutional provision
"no debt in excess of taxes for the current year shall be
created" could have any reference to existing indebtedness. Constitutional elements are to be construed as
meaning that which the framers and individuals who
drew and ratified the constitution believed and intended
them to mean. In determining the meaning of specific
provisions it is proper to consider the wording and
phraseology of other related provisions contained in the
same document and historically contemporary. It is to
be noted that Section 4 of Article XIV, supplementing
Section 3, places a maximum of debt with respect to
10
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"existing indebtedness." It is conceivable that a municipality might be authorized under Section 3 to borrow
a sum greater than permitted by Section 4, and the
purpose of Section 4 is to limit aggregate debt to a pei^
centage of taxable property values, in cutting down other
authorizations.
Clearly an obligation created in years past is not
created in the year in which it or installments thereon
are to be paid. To create a debt within the meaning of
Section 3, Article XIV is to incur a liability, whether paid
presently upon receipt of the goods or service, or protracted as to its satisfaction to future years. We do
not feel, however, that a municipality may be said to have
created a debt within the current year when in that year
they do no more than make a payment upon existing indebtedness. Upon that hypothesis a municipality in any
given year may, without a bond election, create debt equal
to the revenues for that year, and revenues are not to be
diminished by payments which are made upon prior existing indebtedness, for the reason that Section 3 places a
maximum upon debts created within the year and Article 3
of Section 14 does not contemplate existing debt. The
framers of the constitution fixed a maximum of aggregate
debt in the following section, Section 4. In the instant case
the critical year of 1948 reflects payments upon existing
debt of $9,725.68. In our opinion that amount should
not be included as a "debt created in the current year"
and that amount should not be a direct diminution of
the amount fixed as a maximum by Section 3 of Article
XIV for the creation of debt without bond elections.
11
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Particularly appropriate is this argument when the
respondent in its brief at page 7, paragraph 1, even
goes so far as to imply the illegality of some of the
previous issues upon which installments were paid. In
our original appeal brief we questioned the validity of
a $5,000.00 "tax anticipation note" (page 16 of appeal
brief) which was paid in the year 1948 and treated by
the lower court as "debt created within the year" in
cutting down the borrowing power of Spring Cily
to that extent. We respectfully submit that the plaintiff
and appellant ought to be given judgment in any event
to the extent by which the revenues within the year 1948
exceeded the expenditures of the year 1948, exclusive
of $9,725.68 which was spent by the city on retirement
of debt existing from previous years.
Defendant and respondent has raised the question
of failure to provide for the payment of interest upon
the bonds and failure to provide a sinking fund for their
retirement. C.J.S., Vol. 64, page 512, Municipal Corporations, Section 1918, provides :
"A municipal corporation may and sometimes
must, prior to the issuance of bonds, make provision for the payment of such bonds and interest
thereon; but in the absence of such requirement
the failure to provide for the payment of interest
and to create a sinking fund does not affect the
legality of the bonds."
We find no constitutional or statutory conditions
precedent to the validity of bonds which would require
the provision of a sinking fund or a provision for the
payment of interest on the bonds, prior to issue.
12
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CONCLUSION
In summary we respectfully contend that the bonds
are valid in all respects, having been issued at a time
when they, together with previously incurred liability
within the year and fixed charges for the year, did not
exceed anticipated revenues for the year. That having
been valid when created, no subsequent action by Spring
City could invalidate them, and that under the Muir
case and Tuggle decision cited, provision could be made
for their satisfaction in future years.
We respectfully contend that if, after assumption of
this debt, Spring City exceeded its revenues for 1948,
then only the over-issue is void, and in computing the
over-issue, no consideration should be given to fixed
charges which consist of debts created in previous years.
At this point we wish to renew the previous arguments set forth in the original appeal brief in our contention that if the bonds in whole or in part be declared
void, then the plaintiff and appellant ought to recover
upon quantum meruit
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
KEN CHAMBERLAIN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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